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Abstract
I estimate the effects of public health insurance on consumption smoothing and investigate the
extent to which the public insurance interacts with private arrangements of self-insurance. Exploiting
a dramatic expansion in health insurance coverage in rural China, I find that the introduction of
public health insurance helps households completely insure against severe health shocks. The health
insurance also reduces the magnitude of decline during a health shock in investments in children’s
education, agricultural activities and durable goods. The evidence suggests that the benefit of social
insurance for low-income households could also come from reducing the use of costly smoothing
mechanisms.
JEL: D1, O1, I1
1 Introduction
Low-income households in developing countries face high idiosyncratic income risk and at the same time
have limited access to credits and formal insurance markets. Since Townsend (1994), a standard method
to test for full insurance is to estimate the effects of idiosyncratic shocks on consumption fluctuations.1
Despite the lack of formal insurance, many papers have found that households in developing countries
are able to smooth their consumption in response to most idiosyncratic shocks.
∗I thank Arne Bigsten, Ilyane Kuziemko, Magne Mogstad, Marcos Vera and the participants at several seminars and
conferences for helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are mine. Email: kai.liu@nhh.no.
1See Morduch (1995) and Townsend (1995) for a review of this literature.
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One of the main policy implications from this literature is that welfare gains to households from
additional social insurance should be small. If households are able to smooth consumption through
informal insurance fairly well, there would be little welfare gain from additional social insurance, as such
insurance would only crowd-out private channels of consumption smoothing (Morduch, 1995; Gertler
and Gruber, 2002). The last argument, however, hinges on the implicit assumption that the costs of
informal insurance and public insurance are equal. If households are able to substitute cheaper public
insurance for the costly smoothing mechanism they used before, the welfare gains could be substantial.
Indeed, theoretical frameworks developed in Chetty and Looney (2006) and Chetty (2006) show that
social insurance programs can have substantial welfare gains even when consumption does not fluctuate
with idiosyncratic shocks. When households are very risk averse, they may use highly costly measures
to smooth their consumption paths.
To infer the welfare value of additional social insurance programs, it is important to examine the
efficiency costs of the behaviors used by households to smooth consumption. Social insurance programs
could have substantial welfare benefits by reducing the use of costly smoothing techniques even though
consumption may not fluctuate much with shocks to begin with. Testing this hypothesis empirically is
challenging for several reasons.2 First, identifying the causal effect of a social insurance program requires
exogenous variation in the coverage of the program. There are still few formal insurance programs in
developing countries. Existing programs often target specific groups of the population and the take-up
rate is usually low and endogenous. For example, individuals with certain unobserved traits (such as
risk aversion) may self-select into insurance programs, and those unobserved characteristics also affect
their consumption choices and other behaviors. Second, tests of complete insurance require exogenous
and preferably large shocks to household resources, which are hard to identify empirically. Finally,
one also needs a panel data to observe consumption and other variables describing private smoothing
mechanisms over time.
This paper overcomes these difficulties by exploiting the introduction of a large-scaled health in-
surance program in rural China. I have two goals. One is to provide causal estimates of the effects
of public health insurance on consumption smoothing. The second goal, which is more important and
relevant as to inferring the welfare implications of additional social insurance, is to show whether and
2Chetty and Looney (2007) take a first step in this direction by comparing the effects of unemployment shocks on
consumption and investments in Indonesia and the US. A literature review is presented in the next section.
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how additional public insurance interacts with other channels of consumption smoothing in response
to health shocks. The new program, called the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), raises the
percentage of rural households covered by any health insurance plan from less than 10% in 2000 to over
90% in 2009. The introduction of the health insurance program was implemented over a six-year period
from 2003 to 2008 in different counties in rural China at different times. My main estimation strategy
exploits variation in the timing of the introduction of the health insurance reform across counties and
controls for county and year fixed effects. I compare households’ responses to health shocks before and
after the health insurance reform, and between counties that have already implemented the reform to
those that have not yet implemented the reform.
Using panel data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), I find that health insurance
coverage helps households smooth food consumption against severe health shocks. Households were
not fully insured prior to the reform but they are perfectly insured against severe health shocks after
the reform. Moreover, I find that the public health insurance program enables households to shift
away from using costly smoothing mechanisms to cope with severe illness. Prior to the reform, a
negative health shock decreases school enrollment of girls, investment in livestock and durable purchases.
Access to health insurance eliminates these negative effects: households experiencing health shocks
after the reform invest more in the schooling of girls, livestock and durables, relative to the households
experiencing a health shock in the absence of the reform. These results are robust to several checks
which could pose potential threats to identification. The evidence suggests that the benefit of social
insurance, for low-income households that are liquidity-constrained, could come from reducing the use of
costly smoothing mechanisms. Finally, I also test for potential mechanisms by which households achieve
complete insurance with health insurance. I find that the availability of health insurance reduces out-
of-pocket expenditure on treating severe illness by as much as 10% of annual household income. There
is also evidence that access to health insurance diminishes individual productivity losses in the event of
illness, possibly due to an improvement in the quality of treatment.
This paper builds on an important literature trying to understand the channels of consumption in-
surance in developing countries. The literature has suggested important roles provided by savings and
asset accumulation (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999), access to microfinancial institutions (Gertler, Levine,
and Moretti, 2009), sales of durables (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993), and family networks (Angelucci,
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De Giorgi, and Rasul, 2012). An important question for policy is whether and how public insurance
programs interact with different private channels of insurance. A handful of empirical papers have stud-
ied this question. Cutler and Gruber (1996) find that an increase in Medicaid coverage was associated
with a reduction in private insurance coverage. Using data from developing countries, Cox, Eser, and
Jimenez (1998), Attanasio and Rıos-Rull (2000) and Jensen (2004) find that an increase in the benefits
from public transfer programs crowds out incidence and magnitude of private transfers which were used
to support extended family members. The current paper extends this literature in a couple of ways.
First, none of the existing crowding-out estimates is based on an actual insurance program that insures
against certain risks. Second, relatively few papers have identified the causal relation between social
insurance and the private channels of consumption insurance. The health insurance reform that has
taken place in rural China across counties and over time provides exogenous variations to identify the
causal effect. Third, most of these papers study the effects of public programs on private transfers.
This paper shows that public insurance may crowd-in some other private arrangements to cope with
negative shocks (such as investment) and that could lead to very different welfare implications of public
insurance. Chetty and Looney (2007) is the only paper I know which tests the same hypothesis by
comparing the effects of unemployment shocks on consumption and investment behaviors in Indonesia
and the US.
This paper also connects to a large literature estimating the effects of health insurance on health and
health care use. The key empirical challenge facing researchers is to obtain credible variations in health
insurance coverage which are not correlated to unobservable characteristics. Researchers have shown
that the expansion of public health insurance in the US (such as the Medicaid) has positive impact
on health outcomes, particularly for mothers and children (e.g. Currie and Gruber (1996a,b)). More
recently, an influential paper by Finkelstein, Taubman, Wright, Bernstein, Gruber, Newhouse, Allen,
Baicker, et al. (2012) uses the Oregon Medicaid lottery as a convincing random variation in health
insurance coverage for a group of uninsured low-income adults. The authors find that health insurance
coverage leads to higher health care utilization, reduction in out-of-pocket medical expenditures and
better self-reported health outcomes.
While the Chinese expansion in health insurance is not a random experiment in nature, it is attractive
in several ways. First, it is a large-scaled program at a national level. Second, household mobility is
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restricted because of the household registration system, reducing the extent of endogenous selection
of health insurance from mobility. Third, the coverage of health insurance in rural areas before the
reform, including private and public insurance, had consistently been very low and participation rate
in the new public health insurance program is very high. Since the share of compliers is high, the
estimated effects are close to the average treatment effects of health insurance coverage for the entire
population. Fourth, the level of implementation of the new health insurance program is at county
level. Together with limited household mobility, this rules out spillover effects which may confound the
direct effects of health insurance (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). A couple of studies have used the
Chinese health insurance expansion to study its effects on health outcomes. Lei and Lin (2009) and
Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, and Juncheng (2009) do not find any evidence that health insurance
improves average health status (measured by either self-reported health status or doctor-diagnosed
diseases), despite the fact that the program significantly increases the utilization of formal outpatient
and inpatient care and preventive care. They also do not find any evidence that the program reduces
average out-of-pocket expenditures (unconditional on the severity of illness). In section 6 of this paper,
I reconcile their findings with mine. The primary focus of this paper is to study the effects of health
insurance on non-health related outcomes such consumption and investment, which the literature has
not produced much evidence on.3 The effects on non-health outcomes reveal interesting parameters
that are useful for evaluating the welfare implication of health insurance.
The empirical test on consumption insurance follows seminal papers by Cochrane (1991), Mace
(1991) and Townsend (1994). Several papers have studied the insurance of consumption against health
shocks in developing countries. Kochar (1995) and Townsend (1995) conclude that low-income house-
holds appear to be able to insure against health shocks fairly well, despite the fact that health shocks
tend to lower household resources. A more recent paper by Gertler and Gruber (2002) finds imperfect
consumption insurance against major illness. The key component is the definition of major health
shocks, as Gertler and Gruber (2002) find that families are able to insure the costs of minor illness but
not those of major illness. Following their work, I consider health shocks from severe illness.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional background of the health insurance
reform and introduces the data and main variables used in estimation. Section 3 presents the empirical
3Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) finds that expansion in Medicaid leads to a reduction in savings and an increase in
consumption. Similar findings have been found using data from developing countries (Chou, Liu, and Hammitt (2003)).
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model, followed by estimation results in Section 4. Section 5 presents a few robustness checks. Section
6 investigates potential mechanisms underlying the key results. Section 7 concludes. A theoretical
framework is outlined in the appendix.
2 The Data and Institutional Background
2.1 The Health Reform and the NCMS
Before the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, households in rural China had
access to universal health insurance through the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS). When China
reformed its rural economy in 1979 and introduced the Household Responsibility System, the CMS
collapsed and left around 90 percent of all farmers uninsured (Yip and Hsiao, 2008). In the next two
decades, households in rural China had little formal insurance against health shocks. During the 1990s,
despite several attempts to rebuild the CMS, my data shows that less than 15% of the rural households
were covered by any kind of health insurance, public and private combined.
Economic costs associated with illness could be in at least two forms. One is the cost of diagnosis
and medical treatment, and the other is the loss of income if illness limits the ability to work. Each of
these costs can be substantial relative to the income of the households. Aiming to provide a basic social
safety net against the cost of medical treatment for all rural households, in 2003, the central government
launched the NCMS with the goal of offering health insurance to all rural areas by 2010. In replacement
of the old CMS program, the new program was rolled out gradually at county level. The timing of the
establishment was determined by the provincial government and guidelines from the central government.
In 2003, every provincial government was required to select at least 2-3 counties as pilot counties for
the NCMS (State Council, 2003). In 2006, the central government required provincial governments to
expand the program to cover at least 40% of all the counties by the end of 2006 and 60% of all the
counties by 2007 (Department of Health, 2006). By 2008, the program had been implemented in all
rural areas, covering the entire rural population. Therefore, for half a decade, rural households in China
had different access to public health insurance. Whether one was covered by the program depended on
the county in which the household was registered. Because of the strict household registration system
(hukou), mobility of households between counties is restricted.
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Participation in the program is voluntary, but if the household decides to join the program, all
members of the household must be enrolled in the program. Annual premium has been kept low
thanks to heavy subsidies from the government. For example, in 2008, typical annual premium was
20 RMB (3 USD) per person, supplemented by a subsidy of 80 RMB (12 USD) from central and local
government (Department of Health, 2008).4 The amount of subsidies has been increasing over time, and
the central government provides larger subsidies for underdeveloped regions in central and western parts
of China. In the first few years of the reform, the program emphasized coverage of inpatient expenses
and outpatient expenses related to severe illness.5 In recent years, there have been efforts to increase the
coverage of outpatient expenses and lower the deductables for inpatient services (Department of Health,
2008). The benefits of the program vary by county. Two thirds of the counties cover both inpatient
service and outpatient service, with the cost of inpatient service reimbursed through a formula and the
cost of outpatient service reimbursed through a household medical savings account.
Table 1 summarizes the coverage of the program, calculated from the sample used for estimation
(which I discuss momentarily). Among the 36 counties observed in the data6, three had started the
program by 2004. The program expanded quickly, with over 50% of counties having implemented the
program by 2006. By 2009, all the counties in the data were covered by the NCMS. Turning to coverage
at household level, we see from Table 2 the same pattern of increase for households with access to the
NCMS. The proportion of households who are insured by either the old CMS or the NCMS grew quickly
since the implementation of the reform, rising from 6.9% in 2000 to over 94% in 2009. Before the 2009
survey, it is not possible to distinguish coverage by the old CMS from the NCMS at household level.
Since the NCMS had completely replaced the old CMS in 2009, we could infer that the take-up rate of
the NCMS in 2009 is 95%. The final two columns of Table 2 summarize the percentages of households
covered by any kind of health insurance, private and public combined. Health insurance coverage never
exceeded 16% before the reform, and was rising steadily up to 95% in 2009 due to the introduction of
the NCMS.
The estimation strategy (to discuss in Section 3) controls for any time-invariant characteristics at
county level. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if the timing of the implementation of the reform across
4In 2006, about 20% of the costs of the program were covered by the central government, 50% of the costs were financed
by the local government and the remaining 30% came from households’ premium payments (Lei and Lin, 2009).
5See Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, and Juncheng (2009) for detailed evidence on the coverage from a sample of pilot
counties in 2005.
6Four counties from Liaoning province were not surveyed in the 1997 wave.
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counties were uncorrelated with observable county-level characteristics before the reform. The selection
of pilot counties was decided by the provincial government. It could be that counties with low average
income had stronger incentives to push the provincial government for the reform. Table 3 shows the
means and standard deviations of several county-level characteristics in 1997 and 2000, the years before
the introduction of the NCMS, by counties grouped by their years of reform. The table suggests that
there is little relationship between these factors and the timing of the implementation of the reform.
Counties that implemented the reform early do not appear to have significantly different characteristics
than counties that started the reform late.
2.2 The CHNS Data
I use data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey. The survey is based on a multistage, random
cluster process that yields a sample of about 4,400 households with a total of 19,000 individuals that
are tracked over time. The sample covers nine provinces that vary substantially in terms of geography,
economic development, and other socioeconomic indicators. This survey was conducted in 1989, 1991,
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009. I use data from 1997-2009, consisting of five waves which cover
the entire period of the health insurance reform. I use data at both individual and household levels from
the CHNS and focus on the rural sub-sample. The rural households are defined by the head living in a
rural county and holding a rural registration card (hukou). Individual level data contains information on
health, education, health insurance, food consumption and demographics such as age and relationship
to the household head. Household data includes information on agricultural expenditures and various
sources of income. I drop households with intermittent waves to make sure the observed changes in
variables always refer to changes between adjacent waves. Confidential community data from the CHNS
is used to determine the year of implementation of the NCMS at county level.
Since the enrollment into the health insurance program must be at household level, all the variables
analyzed in this paper are defined at household level. To focus on stable households, I keep households
whose head is aged between 25 and 65 and drop households recording a change in the household
head. The measure of consumption available from the CHNS is food consumption, which accounts for
roughly half of the budget share in total household expenditure in rural China during the period of
the sample.7 Food consumption is collected by a dietary questionnaire recording items and amounts of
7Using provincial-level data from the Rural Household Survey Statistics, Yu and Abler (2009) find that the share of
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food consumption over the past three days (including food consumed both at and away from home).
Individual food consumption is provided from the CHNS Individual Daily Nutrients Intake Data. It
contains macronutrients including average daily intake of calories (in kilocalorie), protein (in grams),
fat (in grams) and carbohydrate (in grams). Monetary value of the food consumption is, however,
not readily available from the data. One advantage of working with nutrition intake, as opposed to
the monetary value, is that one does not need to compute the value of home-produced food, prices
of which are usually difficult to predict. In addition, while the budget share of food consumption
decreases with income, nutrition intakes such as protein are luxury goods which could be a better proxy
of nondurable consumption over time (Angelucci and Attanasio, 2013). One drawback is that nutrition
intake would be affected by unobserved food prices which could differ by location and time. In the
empirical analysis, I account for location- and time-specific differences in prices by including a separate
intercept for each county and for each year. I trim the top 0.5% of daily caloric intake (and the other
nutrients associated with outliers in calories), corresponding to daily caloric intakes that are above 5262
kilocalorie. Household level consumption is calculated by summing up individual food consumption and
dividing it by an adult-equivalence scale.8
To capture severe health shocks that have a direct impact on labor supply and consumption, I
define a dummy variable indicating whether the individual, during the past four weeks, had been sick,
injured, or suffering from a chronic or acute disease and had been unable to carry out daily activities
for at least five days.9 Given that the NCMS focuses coverage toward severe illness, the five-days-work-
limiting criterion is meant to identify severe sickness that can affect the household’s endowment. These
questions are available in all waves of the survey for every adult respondent aged above 18.10
food in total expenditure is 59% in 1994 and falls to about 46% in 2003.
8The adult equivalence scale, taken from Angelucci, De Giorgi, and Rasul (2012), is one for household members aged
18 or older, and 0.73 otherwise.
9The survey questions are: “During the past 4 weeks, have you been sick or injured? Have you suffered from a chronic
or acute disease?” and “For how many days during the past 4 weeks were you unable to carry out normal activities due
to this illness?”. In addition to the self-reported sickness, I also use the physical examination data of the CHNS (which is
based on actual examination at the time of the survey) to classify an individual as suffering from severe sickness if he/she
belongs to any one of the following categories: blind on either or both eyes, has lost the use of one or both arms, or has
lost the use of one or both legs.
10An alternative is to define health shocks from questions measuring health status based on the individual’s self-reported
ability to perform daily activities, similar to that used in Strauss, Gertler, Rahman, and Fox (1993); Gertler and Gruber
(2002). The CHNS, however, only collects data on physical limitations for persons aged over 55 and terminates the
collection of these data after the 2006 wave. This means that the health shocks defined by physical limitations are only
available for the elder population and health shocks are not defined for half of the counties that implemented the reform
after 2006. For these reasons, in the main analysis, I focus on the severe sickness measure. Nevertheless, the results on
consumption smoothing using changes in physical limitations as proxies for health shocks show similar patterns as the ones
to report below. These results are available from the author upon request.
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Health status at household level is imputed from health of the head and/or the spouse of the
household. Sickness takes place in a household as long as either the head or the spouse becomes sick.
A healthy household is one where both the head and the spouse are healthy. I define a health change
variable to be zero if there is no change between waves, -1 if the household moves from sick to healthy
and 1 if the household moves from sick from healthy.
Table 4 presents means and standard deviations of the main variables in the selected sample. All
monetary values are deflated by the CPI provided in the CHNS.11
3 Empirical Strategy
The basic empirical analysis is derived from a simple model of consumption choice under two states of
the world. The model is based on Chetty and Looney (2006) and is outlined in the Appendix. The
essential intuition is simple: when a less costly smoothing mechanism becomes available (the NCMS in
our context), in the event of negative shocks to the household resources, the household would substitute
public health insurance for more costly mechanisms used to smooth consumption. There are two
predictions from the model that are directly testable in our context. One is that consumption should
fluctuate less in response to health shocks when the NCMS is available. The extent of the fluctuation
would still depend on risk aversion: if households are very risk averse, consumption changes with the
NCMS may not be significantly different from the consumption changes without the NCMS. The other
testable implication is that, if households resort to costly consumption-smoothing mechanisms before
the reform, one would observe strong crowding out of expensive insurance channels when public health
insurance becomes available. The empirical analysis below attempts to test for any substitutability
between existing smoothing mechanisms and the NCMS.
The empirical test for consumption smoothing follows the standard practice in the literature (e.g.
Cochrane (1991),Townsend (1994)). To test whether households are fully insured against health shocks,
following Gertler and Gruber (2002), I regress changes in consumption on proxies for health shocks.
Under the null hypothesis of complete insurance, the coefficient on health shock should be zero. The
11The price index in the first wave of the survey is calculated based on the cost of a standard consumer basket supplied
by the State Statistics Bureau of China (by province and urban-rural areas). Changes in the price index in future waves
track changes in the national CPI. The price index will not affect the parameters of interest, because it is completely
absorbed by year and county fixed effects.
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idea is that, if households are fully insured against idiosyncratic shocks (either through mutual insurance
or self-insurance), consumption growth should not be correlated with changes in household endowment
once growth in community-level resources are controlled for. To estimate how the insurability of health
shocks changes with and without access to the health insurance program, I add an interaction term
between health shocks and a reform variable Rjt, indicating whether the health insurance reform has
been implemented in county j and wave t.12 The main empirical model is as follows:
4 ln cijt = α04hijt + α1(4hijtRjt) + α2Rjt +4hijtγt +4hijtγj + βXijt + γj + γt + εijt (1)
where 4 ln cijt is the growth in log consumption per adult equivalent for household i in county j,
4hijt is change in health, and γj and γt are county and wave fixed effects respectively. Xijt is a set
of demographic variables controlling for potential taste shifters. It consists of changes in household
size, changes in share of children in the household, and a set of characteristics of the household head
including age, age-squared, education and marital status. Rjt = 1 if county j implemented health
insurance reform in or after wave t. Since reform is an interaction between wave and county, when
interacting reform with changes in health, I am creating a triple-interaction, between time, county
and changes in health. That means there are two interaction terms that need to be controlled for:
4hijtγt are wave fixed effects interacted with health shocks which allow for the flexible time trend in
the effects of health changes, and 4hijtγj are county dummies interacted with health shocks which
control for permanent unobserved heterogeneity across counties in consumption changes in response to
health shocks. Because the number of people reporting changes in health within a county is small, in
estimation, instead of interacting health shocks with county dummies, I interact changes in health with
more aggregated provincial dummies. Therefore, I allow for unobserved heterogeneity in consumption
smoothing across provinces, but restrict the effects to be the same across counties within the same
province.
The wave fixed effects allow for secular changes in outcome over time that may be completely
unrelated to the reform. The county fixed effects allow for the fact that variation in the timing of the
reform across counties may not have been exogenous. Consistent estimation is still achieved so long as
(a) these characteristics are fixed over time during the sampling periods or (b) implementation of the
12Recall that the data is not collected in every year. The sample I am using contains five waves collected in 1997, 2000,
2004, 2006 and 2009.
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reform is not correlated with changes in these characteristics. The county fixed effects would capture
local hospital capacity, level of economic development and other unobserved characteristics that could
be correlated with the timing of the reform.
Equation (1) regresses changes in log consumption on changes in sickness. The first-difference setup
already eliminates unobserved household heterogeneity (such as preferences and health endowment)
which may determine the level of consumption and correlate with sickness at the same time. α1 shows
the effect of a health shock with health insurance coverage. In the context of consumption insurance,
it identifies the causal effect of health insurance on consumption smoothing against health shocks. α2
shows the direct effect of being covered by health insurance (on households that did not experience health
shocks between waves). α0 shows the direct effect of a health shock in the absence of health insurance,
in the baseline county and baseline year. Instead of presenting the full set of estimated parameters α0,
γt and γj , in subsequent tables showing regression results, I compute the average marginal effect of a
health shock in the absence of the health insurance (M0). These are the average effect of the health
shock in the absence of health insurance. I also compute the average effect of a health shock with health
insurance (M1). M1 measures the net effect which is a sum of M0, the average direct effect of the
health shock without insurance, and the parameter α1, the effect from health insurance in mitigating
the health shock.
I use the same empirical model to evaluate the consequences of severe illness on various economic
outcomes, before and after the expansion of health insurance. To capture any common shock to con-
sumption across households within the county and over time, standard errors are clustered at the county
level, which is the level where the reform is implemented.
Threats to identification. There are several potential threats to identifying the causal effects of
the health insurance program. First, while the correlation between reform and permanent county
characteristics is controlled for through county fixed effects, there could be other changes that influence
the timing of the reform and affect the dependent variable of interest at the same time. One way
to test whether such a confounding factor exists is to check whether, conditional on year and county
effects, there is any remaining correlation between the timing of the future reforms and the outcome
variables before the reform. If future reforms predict outcome variables prior to the reform, then it is
likely that there exist unobservable county-specific trends that are correlated with the timing of the
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reform. In the robustness section below, I find no evidence supporting this hypothesis, for almost all
major outcomes of interest. Second, changes in health status are assumed to be exogenous shocks,
conditioning on the observable characteristics, unobserved county and year effects.13 One possibility is
that the marginal utility of consumption may depend on health status directly, or indirectly through
induced changes in leisure when consumption and leisure are not additively separable. In this case, the
growth of consumption will vary with the state of health even with full insurance. Health shock will
then be correlated with omitted preferences in the error term. To test for such state dependence, in
the robustness section, I estimate the model using changes in total consumption by household members
who did not experience a health shock. The main conclusions remain to hold.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Consumption Smoothing
Table 5 reports estimates based on the main empirical model as specified in equation (1). The dependent
variables are growth in household food consumption in terms of four nutritional intakes: calories, protein,
fat and carbohydrate. The first row presents the average effects of a health shock before the reform
on the growth of nutrition intakes. Since the model is specified in first differences, they can also be
interpreted as the average effects of illness on the level of nutrition intakes. I find that negative health
shocks prior to the reform lead to sizable and significant reductions in the growth of protein and caloric
intakes. Growth in these intakes are lowered by 5.3% and 6.8%, respectively.14 Estimates on fat and
carbohydrate intakes are of the same sign but are imprecisely estimated. This evidence suggests that
we can reject the hypothesis of full insurance against severe health shocks before the reform.
After the reform, however, I could no longer reject the hypothesis that households are fully insured
against health shocks. The net effects of the health shock after the reform are shown in the second row
of Table 5. None of the growth in nutrition intakes are significantly affected by the health shock. The
effects of the health shock after the reform subtracts the effects of health shock before the reform is the
consumption smoothing effect of health insurance (parameter α1 shown on the third row). For caloric
13Note that he first-differencing already eliminates any unobserved household characteristics (such as health endowments)
that may confound identifying the effect of illness.
14The estimated effects of illness on consumption without health insurance in rural China are of similar magnitude
compared with estimates from US households. For example, Cochrane (1991) finds that long periods of illness of PSID
households (more than 100 days in a year) lead to a reduction of food consumption growth by 11-14%.
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and protein intake, there are positive and significant effects of health insurance coverage on consumption
smoothing against health shocks – offering access to health insurance completely eliminates the negative
effects on caloric and protein intakes from severe illnesses that were present prior to the introduction
of health insurance. The estimates for fat and carbohydrate are also positive but are not statistically
significant.
The direct effects of health insurance on consumption growth are positive but not significantly
different from zero (the fourth row in the table), indicating that the consumption behavior of households
without experiencing health changes is not affected. Remaining rows in Table 5 show the estimated
coefficients for the main control variables. Growth in per capita log consumption fall with increase in
log household size and rise with increase in the share of children in the household. Consumption grows
at a faster rate for older heads and heads who have at least graduated from primary school.
4.2 Investment
I employ the same empirical model as described in equation (1) to estimate the effects of illness on
investment with and without health insurance. I consider three types of investment that are most
common to all rural households: investment in children’s human capital, agricultural investment and
investment in durable goods.
As human capital investment, I consider the rate of school enrollment, defined as the number of
children who are enrolled in school among those aged between 10 and 18 within the household.15 The
normal age finishing 9 years of schooling is 16. Tuition is free for 9 years of schooling (primary and
lower-middle school education). Schooling would incur costs to purchase books, tools, transportation,
tuition for any schooling of more than 9 years, and opportunity costs in terms of forgone earnings.
Brown and Park (2002) document that in poor counties in rural China, a family with one child in
primary school and another in lower middle school spends as much as fifty percent of expenditures per
capita on fees related to education.
15This variable is defined using a combination of two variables. The first and the main variable is whether the child
is currently enrolled in school. Prior to 2004, this variable was collected from the household survey. Starting from the
2004 wave, this variable is collected from a separate child questionnaire where the respondents must be children under
age 18 living in the household at the time of the survey. To track children who are members of the household but were
temporarily away from the household (temporary migrant workers and students at boarding schools, in particular), I use
another question from the household survey which, for each member away from the household, records the reasons for not
currently residing in the household, such as schooling or seeking employment in cities.
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Table 6 shows that, in the absence of health insurance, severe illness leads to a reduction in children’s
schooling. On school enrollment rate for all children in the household and for boys, the effects of sickness
are negative but insignificant. This suggests that there is no significant reduction in boys’ schooling in
response to health shocks before the reform. On the contrary, sickness leads to large and significant
drop in school enrollment for girls: moving from healthy to severe illness implies a 28.7% decline in
the likelihood of girls being in school. These results are consistent with previous evidence that girls’
schooling in rural China is more sensitive to economic conditions of the household than boys’ (Connelly
and Zheng, 2003; Hannum, 2005; Song, Appleton, and Knight, 2006). After the reform, severe illness no
longer has any significant impacts on human capital investments (row 2 in Table 6). The difference in
the effects of negative health shock before and after the reform implies the interaction effects of health
insurance on other smoothing mechanisms (row 3). In particular, following a negative health shock,
households with health insurance are 40% more likely to keep their girls in school, relative to households
experiencing a health shock without health insurance (column 3). Access to health insurance thereby
reduces the gender difference in schooling within the household that is due to a negative health shock.
As agricultural investment, I consider investment in farming and gardening and livestock. Investment
in farming and gardening refers to the total amount spent, in the past year, on leasing land, purchasing
seedlings, fertilizer, tools, insecticides and hiring labor. Investment in livestock includes the total amount
spent on purchasing, feeding and caring for up to four types of livestock and poultry. Equipment includes
tractor, garden tractor, irrigation equipment, power thresher, household water pump, motorcycle and
automobile. Finally, as investment in durable goods, I create a binary variable indicating whether the
household had purchased durable good in the past 12 months. The categories of durable goods include
television, refrigerator and washing machine, which are the most common and useful appliances in
Chinese households. One problem with the measurement of investment in agricultural activities and
durables is that it is based upon actual investment taken place in the past year. The health shocks are
based on health conditions in the last four weeks. Ideally one would also like to observe health shocks
from the past year, but this is not possible without additional data. Severe health shock in the past
four weeks can be thought of as a proxy for health shock in the past year. In the data, severe health
shock appears to be fairly persistent: conditional on unhealthy in the previous survey, over 20% of the
households remain unhealthy in the current survey. Nevertheless, the results relating to agricultural
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and durable investment should be interpreted with caution.
Columns (4)-(6) presents the estimates on agricultural and durable investment. Before the reform,
the estimates imply that moving from healthy to illness would lower the investment in livestock by
550RMB and the probability of durable goods purchase by 6.7%. Investment in farming is inelastic
to severe health shocks, suggesting that the household without health insurance adjusts its investment
behavior primarily by delaying investments in livestock and durable goods. After the reform, neither
livestock investment nor durable purchase is affected by severe health shocks (row 2). The estimated
parameters α1, which can be interpreted as capturing the “crowding-in” effect between health insurance
and other channels of consumption smoothing, are positive and significant for investment in livestock.
The theoretical model predicts that, when public health insurance becomes available, the household
should smooth consumption by switching from costly smoothing mechanisms to public health insurance.
The findings suggest that, in the absence of public health insurance, low-income households in rural
China reduce girls’ schooling, investment in livestock and delay purchase in durables to cope with severe
health shocks. The availability of the public health insurance program reduces the extent to which the
household rely on these types of investment after a severe health shock.
Finally, note that the direct effects of the reform are not significantly different from zero on all
types of investment. One hypothesis is that the availability of health insurance could reduce incentives
for investment. If investment decisions were made as an ex-ante response against future health shocks
to the household (such as investing more in children’s schooling so they may have higher earnings to
compensate the earnings losses when the head is sick), the availability of public health insurance may
reduce the overall incentives to invest. This does not appear to be the case empirically. The fourth
row of Table 6 demonstrates that the coefficients on reform are close to zero and insignificant in all
types of investment, suggesting that health insurance does not change the investment behaviors of
households that did not experience a health shock. Therefore, the reform shifts investment behavior
through changes in ex-post response to health risk, but not through changes in the ex-ante response.
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5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Dynamic Impacts of the Reform and Pre-treatment Trend
One limitation of the specification of equation (1) is that it assumes that treatment is associated with
a one-time shift in outcomes. Since there was little health insurance coverage for most rural households
before the reform, it may take time for people to understand the details of a new health insurance
program. As a robustness test I also estimate a more flexible equation, allowing the effects of the
reform to vary over time:
4 ln cijt =α04hijt +
a∑
y=−b
αy14hijt1(t− Tj = y) +
a∑
y=−b
αy21(t− Tj = y)
+4hijtγt +4hijtγj + βXijt + γj + γt + εijt (2)
The indicator function is equal to one when the observation is y = −b, ..., a− 1, a waves from the date
Tj , the year that health insurance is provided in county j. The indicator for y < −b is omitted. The set
of τ describes the evolution of outcomes before and after the reform, relative to the outcome b periods
before the reform. In practice I choose to include dummies indicating the first wave immediately prior
to the reform (y = −1), the first wave immediately following the reform (y = 1) and two or more
waves after the reform (y >= 2).16 The flexible specification in equation (2) identifies the effects of the
program immediately after implementation and whether or not they persist over time. One potential
concern is that the timing of the reform could be correlated with changes in unobserved characteristics
(e.g. induced by other reforms). The coefficient on the wave prior to reform is an important test for
differential evolution of outcomes before the reform that may confound the true estimated effects of the
program.
Table 7 shows the dynamic effects of the program on consumption smoothing and investment, where
the previous results suggest significant impacts. The estimates are generally in line with the conclusion
obtained in the last section. On consumption smoothing, the estimates using caloric and protein intakes
show no significant effects in the first wave prior to the reform. The effects are sharply increasing in
the first survey since the reform and also persist into the future. On investment, I find no evidence that
16The reason for combining the effects of two waves or more is that outcomes are observed at most three waves after the
reform (2004, 2006 and 2009) and that few counties started the reform in 2004.
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there is any preexisting trend. The effects on girls’ schooling and durable purchases increase visibly as
the reform begins and persist over time, although the estimates on livestock investment do not suggest
any clear patterns over time.
5.2 State-dependent Preferences
The growth of consumption can be shifted by changes in the state of health even with full insurance,
when the marginal utility of consumption depends on health status directly, or indirectly through in-
duced changes in leisure when consumption and leisure are not additively separable. One advantage
of the CHNS data, compared with other household panel data of consumption, is that it collects food
consumption data at individual level. I construct an alternative measure of adult-equivalent consump-
tion by excluding the consumption of the household head and/or the spouse who ever experienced a
health shock in the panel. This measure circumvents the problem that changes in health may impact
the marginal utility of consumption for the sick member directly. Note that average caloric intakes from
the head and the spouse account for about 65% of the average level of household caloric intake. For
a sick household, by excluding head and spouse who ever become sick, I may only use the variation
coming from the remaining 35% of household consumption. If there are within-household allocation of
food consumption in response to the health shock (such as maintaining consumption level of children
if parents are altruistic), then changes in consumption may be more muted for the rest of the house-
hold. Table 8 presents the set of consumption-smoothing regressions, using changes in the log of this
alternative consumption measure as the dependent variable. The standard errors are larger, making the
estimated effect of health insurance on consumption smoothing insignificant. Nevertheless, the main
conclusion is similar to the baseline measure of consumption: the null hypothesis of complete insurance
is rejected for caloric and protein intakes before the reform, but we cannot reject the hypothesis of full
insurance after the reform.
6 Potential Mechanisms
While there are interesting patterns of substitution between public health insurance and private ar-
rangements of insurance, competing mechanisms could lead to similar findings. A negative health shock
could incur two types of costs on households. One is the medical expenditure needed to treat the illness,
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which can be substantial relative to their income. Another is the negative shock to productivity, which,
depending on the quality of the treatment, could be persistent. The direct effect of health insurance is
to reduce out-of-pocket medical cost to treat severe sickness. In the context of the theoretical model,
this is represented by a direct reduction in the cost of consumption smoothing. Health insurance could
also reduce the productivity loss from a health shock, perhaps indirectly by improving the quality of
treatment after a health shock. This means that the effects of the NCMS may come from reduction in
the severity of health shocks on household resources (represented by changes the extent of the bad state
in the model).
To evaluate the importance of each mechanism, I apply the main empirical model to conduct two
empirical tests. First, I test whether out-of-pocket medical expenditure for treating the severe health
shock is reduced after the reform. The out-of-pocket cost is the portion of the cost paid by the household
for being treated for the same illness that was used to define health shocks. It includes expenditures
on treatment at up to two clinics or hospitals, plus the cost of informal treatment if the individual
seeks informal care. In column (1) of Table 9, I report estimates from the model in equation (1) with
the dependent variable replaced by changes in out-of-pocket medical expenditure. The results indicate
that, without health insurance, moving from healthy to severe sickness leads to nearly 1600 RMB
(approximately 250 USD) out-of-pocket spending on treating the illness. This is close to 10% of mean
annual household income. After the health insurance expansion, severe sickness increases out-of-pocket
spending by 480 RMB, which is not significantly different from zero and 70% less compared to before.
These estimates provide strong evidence that the health insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures
significantly. If the alternative hypothesis is that households were only switching from informal care
to formal care when they gained access to health insurance with out-of-pocket expenditure intact, one
would not expect the out-of-pocket expenditure to be different after the reform. This result appears to
differ from the findings of Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, and Juncheng (2009) and Lei and Lin (2009),
who find that the NCMS does not have significant impacts on the out-of-pocket expenditures. However,
their results are based on average out-of-pocket expenditures, unconditional on the types of health
shock. The policy guidance from the central government made it clear that the program is designed to
reduce the financial burden for rural households suffering from severe sickness. Indeed, for households
without a severe health shock, the reform does not have significant impact on expected expenditures
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(last row of column 1 in Table 9).
As a second test, I look for evidence of whether health insurance help families to reduce productivity
losses from the health shock. To do so, I estimate the baseline model in equation (1) using changes in
income as dependent variables. Columns (2) of Table 9 shows that the effect of illness has significant
negative impact on the income of the head without health insurance. Moving from healthy to sickness
reduces income of the head by more than 30%. With health insurance coverage, the negative impact on
head’s income is completely muted. In columns (3)-(4), I repeat this exercise by focusing on changes
in the total income of head and spouse and changes in total household income, respectively. Compared
with the impact to head’s income without health insurance, the negative effects on head and spouse’s
joint income are smaller and become insignificant when total household income is used. This suggests
that, at least in the absence of health insurance, labor supply from other household members also serves
as a channel to reduce the negative impact of the health shock. After the reform, none of the income
measures is significantly affected by illness. Therefore, it appears that health insurance also dampens
the productivity losses from severe health shock for the head and the spouse. One explanation is that
health insurance may improve the quality of treatment or the health outcome after the severe shock.
In columns (5) and (6), I estimate the model on changes in the number of days affecting normal daily
activity (due to the illness) in the previous month and changes in self-reported health status. The
self-reported health status variable is taken from a question asking the respondent to provide a rank
from 1 to 4 describing his/her health compared to that of other people of the same age (1 is excellent
and 4 is poor). As expected, severe shocks in the absence of health insurance increase the number of
sick days by 12 days in the previous month and the self-reported health status by 0.24 points. After
the reform, severe illness remains to have quantitatively similar effects on the duration of sickness and
health status. The coefficients on the reform dummy interacted with changes in health are insignificant
(row 3 of columns 5 and 6). Therefore, the severity of health risks, measured by either the length
of sickness and self-reported health outcomes, does not appear to be affected by accessing to health
insurance .
Even though there is no direct evidence indicating that health insurance changes the severity of a
health shock, one cannot rule out that health insurance may improve the quality of health care. Lei
and Lin (2009) and Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, and Juncheng (2009) show that the same health
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insurance program significantly increases the utilization of formal outpatient and inpatient care, both
of which could lead to better treatment against severe sickness. If the quality of treatment goes up,
the effect of health shock on individual income may become smaller and less persistent. Testing this
hypothesis is left for future work, as the CHNS data does not contain variables measuring the quality
of health care.
7 Conclusion
I investigate the impacts of public health insurance coverage on consumption smoothing and investment
for households in rural China. By doing so I aim to address two research questions. One is whether
additional social insurance in developing countries could help households better smooth consumption.
The other question, perhaps more importantly, is how additional social insurance interacts with existing
private insurance arrangements. The empirical challenge is that individuals with certain unobserved
traits (such as risk aversion) may self-select into insurance programs, and the unobserved heterogeneity
also affects consumption and investment choices. In contrast to previous studies, I am able to address the
problems of selection and omitted variables bias by exploiting a dramatic expansion in health insurance
coverage in rural China. I find that the introduction of public health insurance leads to complete
consumption insurance against severe health shocks. Public health insurance also crowds in investment
in girls’ education and agricultural activities, suggesting that households were using costly mechanisms
to self-insure against health shocks when health insurance was unavailable.
Understanding both questions is highly important and relevant to policy in developing countries.
The existing literature has suggested that public insurance programs may have little net effects on the
welfare of the intended beneficiaries, because the provision of these programs may crowd out private ar-
rangement of self-insurance. To understand the net welfare gain of public insurance programs, the more
important policy question is at what cost public insurance replaces private arrangements of smoothing
against shocks. The evidence from rural China suggests that, at least for low-income households that
are liquidity constrained and for idiosyncratic shocks that are large relative to household resources,
additional public insurance programs could lead to net gains by reducing the use of costly self-insurance
mechanisms. Analyzing consumption fluctuations alone may provide an incomplete picture of the true
welfare gains of additional social insurance.
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A Appendix: An Analytical Framework
I follow Chetty and Looney (2006) to sketch a simple model highlighting the welfare gains from publicly
provided insurance. Suppose there are two states in the world, one with good health and one with bad
health. Suppose that, in the good state, the utility cost of obtaining consumption level c is θgc. In the
bad state, the utility cost of reaching consumption level c requires a larger cost θbc. I normalize θg = 1,
so θb measures the additional utility cost of reaching consumption level c in the bad state, relative to
the cost in the good state. If θb is high, households that are hit by shocks will need to sacrifice more
in order to reach the same consumption level as before. To facilitate the discussion later, suppose the
household can choose from a menu of insurance channels denoted by {θ1b , θ2b , . . .}. θkb summarizes the
cost of consumption smoothing from different channels. A utility-maximizing household would choose
the θb = min{θ1b , θ2b , . . .}. Assuming a CRRA utility function, the optimal changes in consumption in
response to a bad health shock can be written as
4ci
ci
= 1− ( 1
θb
)1/γ (3)
where γ is the coefficient of risk aversion. From equation (3), it is obvious that changes in consumption
depend on two parameters: the cost of consumption smoothing and the coefficient of risk aversion.
Consumption may not fluctuate much in response to health shocks because of either a low cost of
smoothing (such as easy access to the credit markets) or a high cost of smoothing but with households
that are very risk averse (γ is large). To evaluate the welfare consequences of insurance policies, one
must determine why and how households smooth consumption – because of high risk aversion (large γ)
or through good insurance arrangements (low θb). Looking at consumption changes alone would not be
sufficient to distinguish between these two explanations.
The health insurance reform considered in this paper can help to distinguish between the two expla-
nations of consumption smoothness. The availability of health insurance to cover lumpy expenditures of
health care can be thought of as an additional channel to insure against health shocks. Suppose the cost
of smoothing consumption using health insurance is θhb . If θ
h
b is higher than θb, the existing channel of
insurance, consumption fluctuations in response to health shocks would not change after the availability
of health insurance. If public health insurance is a cheaper way to insure against health shocks (θhb
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smaller than θb), then we should observe a smoother consumption stream in response to health shocks
after the reform than before the reform. The change in smoothness still depends on the risk aversion
parameter. If households are very risk averse, a health insurance program may still have a small impact
on consumption smoothness. A better measure of the welfare gain of the program is to look directly
at the substitution patterns between health insurance and other pre-existing insurance channels. If
households resort to costly consumption-smoothing mechanisms before the reform, one would observe
strong crowding out of expensive insurance channels when public health insurance becomes available.
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Table 1: Implementation of the Health Reform By County
Counties
Year Total Treated % treated
1997 32 0 0.0%
2000 36 0 0.0%
2004 36 3 8.3%
2006 36 21 58.3%
2009 36 36 100.0%
Table 2: Implementation of the Health Reform By Households
Households
Year Total Access to NCMS % access Insured by CMSa % insured by CMSa Insured % insured
1997 1,407 0 0.0% 181 12.9% 219 15.6%
2000 1,661 0 0.0% 114 6.9% 159 9.6%
2004 1,601 119 7.4% 230 14.4% 264 16.5%
2006 1,575 889 56.4% 791 50.2% 818 51.9%
2009 1,442 1442 100.0% 1369 94.9% 1382 95.8%
Notes: a. CMS includes both the CMS prior to the reform and the NCMS program after the reform. In the CHNS data,
it is not possible to distinguish whether a household is covered by the old CMS from the NCMS.
Table 3: Characteristics of Counties by Reform Years, Prior to the Reform
Years of Reform
2004 2006 2009
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Households with severe sickness (%) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Total household income 15205.67 2844.97 14900.89 4674.06 15349.80 5889.60
Household with health insurance 0.20 0.26 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.26
Head with at least 9 years of schooling 0.53 0.13 0.47 0.10 0.43 0.13
Age of household head 44.71 1.61 43.83 3.01 45.44 2.41
Number of counties 3 18 15
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Observations
Age of Head 47.05 9.65 7686
Married 0.93 0.26 7654
Head with at least 9 years of education 0.52 0.50 7686
Household Size 3.86 1.41 7611
Household Income 20458.67 25284.17 7546
Income from farming and gardeninga 8625.93 9451.19 6663
Income from livestockb 1266.54 6452.42 4014
Investment in farming and gardeninga 1827.63 2329.88 4027
Whether purchase durables 0.12 0.32 7686
Share of children (aged 10-18) in schoolc 0.74 0.40 3269
Calories (in kilocalorie) 2374.18 658.22 7622
Protein (in grams) 67.60 22.74 7622
Fat (in grams) 68.45 36.55 7622
Carbohydrate (in grams) 366.48 116.18 7622
Major illness 0.04 0.21 7540
Notes:
a. For households with farming activities on a collective, state or a household farm.
b. For households with activities in raising livestock or poultry either on a collective or at home.
c. For households with children aged between 10 and 18.
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Table 5: Effects of Health Insurance on Consumption Smoothing
Calories Protein Fat Carbohydrate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effects of health shock -0.068*** -0.053* -0.096 -0.036
before the reform (0.025) (0.031) (0.067) (0.024)
Effects of health shock 0.046 0.048 0.065 0.026
after the reform (0.042) (0.035) (0.089) (0.042)
Reform×∆health 0.114* 0.101* 0.161 0.062
(0.059) (0.058) (0.135) (0.057)
Reform 0.044 0.059 0.101 0.041
(0.053) (0.064) (0.137) (0.055)
∆ log hh. Size -0.086*** -0.059** -0.146*** -0.050**
(0.019) (0.023) (0.044) (0.021)
∆ share of children 0.065* 0.021 0.062 0.074*
(0.035) (0.046) (0.093) (0.037)
Head’s age -0.009 -0.012* -0.005 -0.011*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
Head’s age2/100 0.008 0.011 0.002 0.011*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006)
Head married -0.011 -0.013 0.011 -0.022
(0.016) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016)
Head primary school 0.031** 0.029* -0.020 0.047**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.026) (0.018)
Head lower-middle school 0.023* 0.020 -0.003 0.030*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.015)
Head upper-middle school or more 0.033** 0.042** -0.022 0.051**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.019)
N 4967 4967 4967 4967
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates are from the model as in equation (1) in text. The model is estimated by
OLS. Standard errors are clustered at county level and are shown in parentheses.
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Table 6: Effects of Health Insurance on Investment
Human Capital Investment Agricultural Investment HH. Durables
∆ % of children ∆ % of boys ∆ % of girls ∆ inv. in ∆ inv. in P(purchase
in school in school in school farming livestock durables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effects of health shock -0.074 -0.060 -0.287*** 196.832 -550.848*** -0.067**
before the reform (0.089) (0.109) (0.077) (242.762) (184.973) (0.027)
Effects of health shock 0.029 -0.012 0.113 243.280 249.986 0.027
after the reform (0.122) (0.155) (0.142) (344.531) (240.188) (0.047)
Reform×∆health 0.103 0.048 0.400* 46.448 800.834* 0.094
(0.166) (0.234) (0.198) (459.577) (396.331) (0.070)
Reform -0.022 -0.019 -0.043 -330.159 -618.474 -0.029
(0.056) (0.074) (0.079) (474.010) (435.803) (0.023)
∆ log hh. Size 0.021 0.056 -0.014 114.739 -163.376 0.071***
(0.091) (0.090) (0.178) (119.173) (156.825) (0.017)
∆ share of children -0.636*** -0.157 -0.427** 89.427 -346.426 0.005
(0.125) (0.160) (0.177) (445.672) (336.852) (0.037)
Head’s age -0.040* -0.074*** -0.053 -22.356 13.520 0.005
(0.020) (0.024) (0.035) (56.511) (40.245) (0.006)
Head’s age2/100 0.043** 0.077*** 0.055 15.324 -18.682 -0.004
(0.021) (0.026) (0.037) (57.967) (41.581) (0.006)
Head married -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 33.127 139.306 0.043**
(0.049) (0.091) (0.086) (103.792) (172.631) (0.017)
Head primary school 0.064* -0.076 0.189*** -8.482 -306.174 -0.002
(0.034) (0.058) (0.053) (75.084) (190.169) (0.016)
Head lower-middle school 0.051 -0.033 0.096 -28.239 -204.940 0.017
(0.032) (0.059) (0.057) (57.134) (132.089) (0.018)
Head upper-middle school 0.094** 0.046 0.134*** -109.449 -208.098 0.031*
or more (0.035) (0.065) (0.048) (105.615) (202.656) (0.018)
N 1641 984 837 2054 2150 5044
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates are from the model as in equation (1) in text. The model is estimated by
OLS. Standard errors are clustered at county level and are shown in parentheses.
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Table 7: Dynamic Effects of Health Insurance
Consumption smoothing ∆ % of girls ∆ inv. in P(purchase
Calories Protein in school livestock durables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Waves since reform
×∆health
1 0.112 0.101 0.647** 579.442 0.095
(0.074) (0.083) (0.253) (630.717) (0.086)
2+ 0.154* 0.152 0.542** -326.277 0.076
(0.090) (0.095) (0.225) (558.303) (0.078)
-1 -0.002 0.001 0.207 -306.575 0.002
(0.057) (0.060) (0.197) (679.179) (0.058)
N 4967 4967 837 2150 5044
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates are from the model as in equation (2) in text. The model is estimated by
OLS. Standard errors are clustered at county level and are shown in parentheses.
Table 8: Effects of Health Insurance on Consumption Smoothing: State-dependent Preferences
Calories Protein Fat Carbohydrate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effects of health shock -0.058* -0.072** -0.026 -0.045
before the reform (0.032) (0.035) (0.072) (0.035)
Effects of health shock -0.021 0.008 -0.161* -0.002
after the reform (0.057) (0.051) (0.094) (0.066)
Reform×∆health 0.036 0.080 -0.135 0.043
(0.076) (0.073) (0.143) (0.087)
Reform 0.026 0.042 0.067 0.027
(0.056) (0.067) (0.140) (0.057)
N 4844 4844 4844 4844
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates are from the model as in equation (1) in text. The model is estimated by
OLS. Standard errors are clustered at county level and are shown in parentheses.
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Table 9: Effects of Health Insurance on Out-of-pocket Expenditures, Income and Health
∆ Out-of-pocket ∆ head’s ∆ H+S ∆ HH Days of Changes in
expenditure income income income Sickness health status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effects of health shock 1598.615** -0.322*** -0.240* -0.137 12.23*** 0.237***
before the reform (324.727) (0.110) (0.120) (0.098) (0.098) (0.085)
Effects of health shock 480.880 0.075 -0.045 0.179 14.02*** 0.322**
after the reform (459.381) (0.255) (0.238) (0.146) (1.127) (0.146)
Reform×∆health -1117.735* 0.397 0.196 0.316* 1.787 0.085
(660.958) (0.280) (0.298) (0.183) (1.445) 0.152
Reform -65.197 0.022 0.162 0.083 -0.315** 0.003
(139.935) (0.184) (0.182) (0.139) (0.147) (0.088)
N 4965 3588 4300 4875 4810 3174
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates are from the model as in equation (1) in text. The model is estimated by
OLS. Standard errors are clustered at county level and are shown in parentheses. Note that the self-reported health status
is not available in the 2009 survey.
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